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TWO PATHS IN SEARCH OF (THE) MEANING (OF THINGS) 
by Klaus Krippendorff 
Introduction 
l 
In this paper I intend to examine several espistemological difficulties one quite 
naturally encounters within traditional semiotics, especially when trying to apply it to 
design (industrial design and product semantics 1 in particular) 
Whenever a discipline encounters intellectual challenges that it cannot respond t。
in terms 01 its own standard practices, it can either exorcise them and withdraw into a 
smaller domain 01 increasingly relined but narrow applications, or it can expand its 
conceptual horizon and embrace these challenges with the prospect 01 thereby loosing 
its own identity. I preler the latter. My plan therelore is to remove those assumptions 
that lead to untenable semiotic practices, practices that prevent semiotics Irom 
participating in solving contemporary social problems, and develop lrom what remains 
an alternative approach to the study 01 meaning in the broadest sense, an approach that 
can more readily cope with certain intellectual challenges emerging Irom a variety 01 
scholarly and practical endeavors 
Seeking to understand meaning generally and the meaning 01 designed objects 
particularly, we are invariaþly lead to a point at which we have to make a critical choice 
between two alternative paths 01 understanding (things). The well-trodden path is called 
。bjectivism. I will call the other constructivism. Without denying that there are various 
2 shades 01 objectivism and various shades 01 constructivism"', just as there also are many 
variations in approaches to semiotics, 1 do believe the two paths are epistemologically 
incommensurable3 and lead to significantly different social practices. 
Roughly, Q미g다파띨m entails a commitment to the beliel in a reality that possesses 
observer- or culture-independent structures, objects, codes and laws waiting to be 
discovered, enciphered and described. For objectivists, humans are plagued by 
observational biases, inadequacies, illusions and metaphysical beliefs that scientific 
observers seek to overcome in order to obtain increasingly accurate accounts of the one 
universe that exists outside 01 them. Objective knowledge is representative 01 what 
exists and the criterion for accepting a proposition as (empirically) valid is truth by 
correspondence.4 
I am suggesting that the mainstream 01 semiotic scholarship is deeply rooted in 
the kind of objectivism just described. This already is evident in its foundational concept: 
the 
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stands for, or an artilact and what it 잉<presses. Not only is the essential connection 
between the two domains presumed discoverable, identifiable, describable and, hence, 
residing outside the observing semiotician, the product 01 scientific practice, here 
semiotic theory, is conceived descriptive 01 an objective reality as well. 1 suspect this 
commitment to objectivism runs so deep that many semiotically informed readers of this 
paper may not lind anything objectionable in this view. Taking language to refer t。
something that exists independently of it seems so obviously true. Oddly, it is the 
practice of designing meaningful objects that might constitute a sufficiently strong 
challenge of mainstream semiotics' receiv.ed ontology. 
Constructivism, the way 1 see it, takes reality as residing neither somewhere 
outside or independent of its human observer, of which objectivists are unshakably 
convinced, nor inside an imagining human mind, as solipsists hold true, but as arising 
within the circular process 01 perception and action or of conceiving and making things, 
in other words, in practice or in social practice when other humans are as well involved 
Consider walking on a beach. We feel the sand between our toes and several 
inches beneath our feet and soon come to know properties we could not see before we 
stepped on (or into) it: the softness, the warmth, the sound it makes walking. What 
objectivists must describe as a reflection from the yellow spectrum of the sunlight 
becomes for the constructivist meaningful and alive thought individual and multisensory 
participation. If we cut us once on a piece 01 glass buried beneath the sand’s surface, 
we are inclined to see glass everywhere and walk accordingly. Understanding has 
nothing to do with the physics of sensation. It penetrates the visual surfaces 01 
something deep into its interior. It creates a reality on which we act, a reality that 
becomes manifest in practice. 
Consider the notion of a gift. We give all kinds of things all the time, whether as 
pa야 01 the role we are assuming, in exchange for money or in the expectation of a future 
benefit. However, what constitutes a gift is carefully negotiated between givers, 
recipients and third parties or judges not to be confused with a bribe, an insult, a burden, 
an obligation or aid 。이ectivists will have a hard time to find the references for what 
appears to be a meaningful gift. Constructivists would consider the noti 
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artilacts by others, but they do behave according to their own understanding 01 their 
own experiences, whether this concerns the highly personal construction 01 sand on the 
beach or the social construction 01 a gift. Taking "under-standing" Iiterally suggests that 
it stands beneath or grounds reality in the social practice 01 people Iiving together. 
Social practice simply becomes an unlolding 01 the constructions in the understanding 01 
participating individuals. Understanding is lar lrom static. We might approach a new 
product with curiosity but always handle it as a variation lrom what we already know and 
what we want it to be. 
Radical constructivists moreover apply the propositions they make about others 
to themselves and consequently see their very own probing into meaning as a social 
practice arising in their own understanding critically involving the construction 01 similarly 
capable others 
Leaving this introduction behind, I will now explore the two alternatives. Let me 
lirst proceed along the well known road 01 mainstream and, as 1 ciaim, objectivst 
semiotics until some 01 its entailments come in sight and then retract to proceed on the 
path less travelled, sketching the conceptual milestones I see there in passing. Figure 1 
serves as a map 01 this efforl. 
Figure 1 
The Usual Road of Mainstream Semiotics' Objectivism 
Based on the lamous semiotic triangle whose corners are occupied by sign-
vehicle, designatum and interpretant, by utterance, meaning and concept or by related 
tri-partitions lavoured by individual semioticians, Morris’ division 01 the semioticians’ 
labor into syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Morris, 1938) is widely accepted as evident 
in encyclopedias and dictionaries (e.g. Sebeok, 1986). Let me state their delinitions lor 




Syntax is the study 01 the relations between sign-vehicles (to which some 
physical existence is ascribed) , 
S을띠anti드9. is the study 01 the relations between sign-vehicles and their designata, 
particularly the objects which they may or do denote, their relerents, and 
E떡딩믹a낀딩흐 is the study 01 the relations between signs and their users and includes 
in its-domain all the psychological , biological, and sociological phenomena that 
occur in the functioning 01 signs 
Although these delinitions appear obvious and innocent, 1 am suggesting that 
they exemplify a vocabulary that drives semioticians, possibly quite unknowingly, along 
the objectivist road. Notice in these delinitions (1) that they presume an embedded 
4 
hierarchy whose base rests upon the materiality of sign-vehicles that become signs by 
virtue of their non-physical, grammatical, semantic and pragmatic ways of functioning; 
(2) that the various relations being studied here, whether these are based on 
resemblances, naturallaws, or conventions, are presumed to actually exist independent 
of describing them, descriptions being viewed as representative or a reflection of the 
relations as observed, and (3) that the semioticians offering descriptive accounts of their 
。bservations in these three areas of inquiry, their own discourse, their intellectual 
concerns and historical or cultural backgrounds, nowhere enters the semiotic project. 
Like gods, semioticians keep themselves outside their object of interest. This indeed is a 
textbook example of objectivism at work. 
Allow me to reframe the three areas of semiotic studies to make the nature of the 
implied objectivism more transparent. Evidently: 
* 
* 
Svntax is the description of aJealitv in which humans do not exist or are not 
없l깅염없댐2짧￡gi짧앓*gR짧암짧폐SS짧협gg짧염않짧F;t:g쁨없뿐1$sis 
。r purpose' may be. Geometry, grammar, composition rules and mathematics are 
typicallanguages for syntactical descriptions of sign-vehicl겉s ， but none provide in 
them a place for their human creators, users or observers 니 
S흐띠쁘따윈등 the descriotion of a realitv in which all humanl' (with~~ a ~ommunity) 
a띨쁘흐효a띠sl. and can therefore be ignored. This is already manifest in accepting 
claims of the rather common form "something 띠응an흐 。r refers to something other 
than itself" or "something i흐 a symbol or a substitute for something else," either of 
which may be said to be part of an sl.씩학띠g code. Notwithstanding the 
acknowledgement that some of the semantic relations or codes are established by 
con이lention; legislated by authority or, in the case of symptoms, as having to be 
discovered in nature anâ learnedto be acted upon, describing them without 
references to human cognition presupposes that semantic relations or codes exist 
independent of their creators and users and outside of whoever accounts for them 
Thisobjectification divorces meanings from the very "somebody" that Charles S. 
Pierce, in his definition of sign, made responsible for something to be meaningful. 
Except for confining semantic descriptions to a speech community or culture, 
humans turn out to be irrelevant in such objecti씨st accounts of meaning. Finally: 
* Praamatics is the descriotion of how humans resoond to a realitv that is the 
same for evervonsl. (,:,ithin a c~m.m~nit~). St~dy.inq "~he ~~es ~f si (il~s" pesun:es 
kn。wing the SIgns whose use is belng lnvestigated- lnquirk1g int。 ”the interpretat1on 
of a texP' presu-mes the existence of a text that is knowable and independent of its 
interpretation. By packing into pragmatics all the biological, psychological, 
sociological and political aspects of signs presumes a non-biological, non-
psychorogical, non-sociological and non-political realm of e)(istence in which signs, 
their syntax and semantics reside una什ected by their use 。이ectivist pragmatics 
(which almost is a contradiction in terms) here admits individual variation, whether 
due to biases, incompetencies, misunderstandings or interests, but always in 
response to or in the'use of a common reality, a universe of shared signs, symbols 
。r meanings that are the same for everybodý. --how else could one establish 
biases, 
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One may not like this characterization 01 semiotics, but 1 suggest it lairly 
accurately describes mainstream semiotics’ epistemological assumptions as manilest in 
its vocabulary and linguistic practices. Let me elaborate on live entailments 01 objectivist 
semiotics, its intellectual imperialism, its predisposition lor standardization, it dualism, its 
paradoxes and inconsistencies, and its lack 01 sell-relerence. An example might 
illustrate where this road takes us. 
Its Intellectual Imperialism. In a recent and unlortunately rather naive article in 
Eα띠， Uri Friedlander (1989) , a designer by trade and probably quite unaware 01 the 
epistemology he was tampering with, tried to drag product semantics along the very 
。bjectivist road it had deviated Irom by accounting lor the meaning 01 artilacts without 
any concern lor either individual cognition or the social practices 01 users or designers. 
To support his contention, that product semantics was already known during the stone 
age, he presented several images 01 artilacts. Two examples are reproduced in Figure 2 
respectively captioned "bronze handle" 01 a door with the comment "the lion as symbol 
01 protection. Roman 100-300 AD" and "cosmetic spoon. The lion and the eagle as 
guardian angel 01 beauty ... Egypt 1250BC." 
Figure 2 
Notwithstanding his rather careless conlusion 01 ages, one is compelled to ask: 
How does Friedlander know what these artilacts meant? How can he possibly speak lor 
what people had in mind thousands 01 years ago? Does he have any evidence about 
how the artilact now called "cosmetic spoon" was perceived, talked about and used by 
ancient Egyptians? Were there guardian angels? Was the owner 01 the house with such 
a bronze handle really so insecure that he or she needed the image 01 a lion lor 
protection? And did it work? 
Let me propose that any assertion 01 what something means speaks loremost lor 
the speaker, here a 1989 Friedlander. A statement 01 what something means to 
someone else is far more difficult to substantiate. 1I we happen to lind something 
interesting and meaninglul to warrant joint attention or il we see it as a sign 01 something 
else, then this takes place in our own contemporary culture, in our own living language 
and in the presence 01 our own cognition. Our own and always contemporary 
perception provides us with no indication 01 how the ancient maker or users 01 an artilact 
saw what we see or was conscious 01 what we now t 
6 
paintings 01 Lascaux, lor a stone age example, had any notions resembling ours, least 01 
all of product semantics. The claim that one’s own perceptions equal those of everyone 
else, past and future, here and everywhere is an ethnocentrism, or betler still, an 
intellectual imperialism we ought not to tolerate in our midst and certainly not clothe in 
scientific terms. 
I am suggesting that the intellectual imperialism in the above is the consequence 
of a vocabulary that drives mainstream semioticians to confuse their discourse and their 
way of seeing with the objectivity of the things seen or talked about and constructs a 
single, objective and coherent universe in which humans either play no role (in the case 
。f syntax) or are so alike (in the case of objectivist semantics) that their nature does not 
matter. The imperialists’ language here becomes privileged, universal and transparent. 
This imperialism does not 싸11 people or capture territory (although such could become its 
consequence). Minimally, it is an act of disrespect for the cognitive autonomy of other 
individuals, their ability to make their own sense of their own world and maximally, it is an 
act 01 oppressing the views of other cultures, ethnic minorities and the less privileged, 
ruling their identity out of existence to the benefit of the semioticians’ 。wn position of 
authority 
Since there is no easy test for the sharing of perceptions among contemporaries 
and much less across cultures and ages, an objectivist discourse on meaning that 
generates assertions like "the lion is a symbol of protection" (without qualifying for whom, 
when and in what circumstances) , implying that everyone must be able to see what s。
。bviously and objectively "exists," claims unquestionable hegemony over the discourses 
。f others. The publication of Friedlander’s therewith expressed views implicitly supports 
the imperialist claims of mainstream semiotics. Even modern market researchers would 
discredit themselves by not qualifying accounts of the meanings of products. 
Its Predisposition for Standardization. If 1 were to see a door with a ring held 
in place by what resembles to me a lion’s teeth , I could invent numerous equally 
plausible explanations ranging from the reputed strength of a lion’s teeth (the conviction 
"a lion will not surrender his prey" maybe an analogue to "the ring can ’t be pulled out") to 
that it might be the original home 01 a traveller, hunter or li。
7 
readers from recognizing cultural diversity. 
The semiotic view of communication as exchanging signs chosen from a common 
repertoire α as using a common code for translating sign-vehicles into their 
corresponding designata (or representations thereof) elevates the objectivists ’ 
disrespect for cultural diversity and individual autonomy to a theoretically motivated 
social norm. In this view, only the sharing of meanings, only the invariability of encoding 
and decoding processes, only the sameness of the senders' and receivers' processing 
equipment makes communication and by implication society possible. Accordingly, if 
the image of a lion would not mean the same for everyone it could not induce the fear 
necessary to deter thieves or offer protection against disasters, just as a message that 
does not point everyone to the same referent could not have generalizable effects. In 
this objectivist view, the standardization of signs, their meanings and their use, is a 
prerequisite of understanding, communication and social orderliness. 
It is therefore not surprising that Friedlander is driven to the very same 
conclusion, calling for the search and use by designers of "culture-independent 
symbols," implying that they could exist everywhere and for everyone alike. In the same 
vein, the writer of the call for papers for the design section of this congress laments the 
lack of uniformity in human-product relationships and warns against a new "Babylonian 
confusion" in the design of computer interfaces, especially in the icons used for 
manipulating computer screens. Undoubtedly, there occasionally are good reasons for 
inventing and institutionally enforcing standardized symbol systems, for example , public 
traffic signs, whose ability to coordinate human behavior benefits all participants. But 
such examples are few 
In design, standardization has always supported mass production for mass 
consumers and enabled mass control. In contrast, whether this is due to an increasing 
material abundance, to the availability of new technologies, to widespread 
democratization of culture or to post-modern attitudes, standardization for the sake of 
theory is increasingly seen as oppressive. For example, personal computers were 
developed with the explicit intent to counter what was then perceived as a tendency 
towards centralization of intelligence. This new technology was envisioned as cheap 
and henc 
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the process. Standardization of user interfaces, the rational submission to predefined 
functionalities and the conformity of use, has driven even large scale computer 
manufacturers out of business. 1 am suggesting that a discipline, a theory or a discourse 
whose normative implications are contradicted by so many contemporary experiences 
becomes non-viable in the long run 
Its Inherent Dualism. The Cartesion dualism is fundamental to all kinds of 
。bjectivisms and naturally at home in mainstream semiotics. This is evident in the 
foundational distinction between the world of signs, symb미s and linguistic expressions 
and the world of unlabeled objects and observer-independently existing physical events 
The former possess the ability to mean, refer to, substitute for, represent or describe the 
latter, but not the other way around. The two worlds are construed as being governed 
by different laws, the semiotic rules or codes, and the natural (protoypically physical but 
also including biological, psychological and some would even add sociological) laws. 
The semiotic dualism replicates the stereotypical distinction between culture and nature 
。r between mind and matter and is sometimes rationalized in philosophical realism. 
This dualism is not a mere philosophical issue. In the design of industrial 
products, for example, it assigns product meanings and product functionalities or 
materialities to distinct phenomenal domains an thereby promotes a partic미 arly suspect 
design practice. It makes semiotic practitioners, like Friedlander, to talk about the 
meaning of a door handle as if the door handle were an object that could exist without 
meaning (for anyone) and to which some meaning could mysteriously be attached (by 
its designer). Accordingly, it becomes natural for semioticians to look for that additional 
feature in the inessential aspects of form, the image of a lion’s head, for example, 
implying that without some such feature the door handle would have to be without 
meaning or meaningless and moreover, that the perceiving and being able to handle 
what the word "door handle" designates has noting to do with its meaning 
Helen Karmasins7, representing a marketing view of product semantics, is guided 
by the very same dualist conceptions, conceiving meaning as a value adding feature of 
consumer products. 1 am far from denying what 1 see as her main point, that designers’ 
awareness of semantics can i 
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su디략따피ng cheaper materials while maintainina traditionallv valued aooearance~， Iike 
pressing Navaho jewelery out of plastic, or (4) ß응을Q흐iating them with R.얻학넘띠니흐 
indivi뎌니als ， designers, prominent figures that the users are made to believe they could 
emulate. 
Instead of seeking to understand how something comes to be meaningful in 
users' minds and to enable this process through informed product design, the dualism 
implied in the semiotic vocabulary, conveniently embraced by the rhetoric of advertising, 
creates a make belief world of deceptive symbolisms behind which lack of 
understanding, alienation and frustration necessarily lingers. 
Its Absurdities and Contradictions. For one example, the dualism just 
assessed for its practical implications also leads to strange contradictions. If one insists 
on distinguishing between a realm in which naturallaws govern physical events 
independent of human observation and a realm consisting of semiotic phenomena, 
signs, symb이s and linguistic expressions which seemingly are the products of human 
consciousness, how can mainstream semioticians justify studying their empirical domain 
from the very same removed and outsider’s perspective that physicists employ to inquire 
into theirs? How can one simultaneously claim semiosis to be a phenomenon of human 
consciousness and yet describe it as if humans either did not exist, have nothing to d。
with it or variously use what is considered same for everyone? Doesn’t this kind of 
semiotics conceptually undermine its own premise. 
Consider another example. Ulric Neisser (1976) , after conducting numerous 
experiments, concluded that we do not see things but meanings. James Gibson (1979, 
1982), before him said much the same by suggesting that we do not perceive 。이ects 
but affordances. Gestalt psychologists build their approach on the experimentally 
verifiable experiences that we cannot identify absolute sounds but contrasts between 
them, melodies for example, that we recognize figures only against a ground, in other 
words, that an observer-independent physics of sensory impressions has little to say 
about what and how we see. Imanuel Kant, long ago, concluded: things as such are 
constitutionally inaccessible to us. Obviously, one cannot simultaneously claim that we 
。nly see meanings and that an object (which we would have to be able to distinguish 
and identify as such without its meaning) has (or conveys) me 
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Unicorns exemplify another class of semiotic oddities. Unicorns, we know, do not 
exist. When we see one we therefore must deny its status both as real and as a pictorial 
representation of something real. This lack of reference leads us to describe unicorns 
with a syntacticallanguage that cannot but bring to bear on its description the kind of 
experiences we have with the animals unicorns remind as of, thus reintroducing the 
representational attributes just denied. A film shot in the stage set of a totally imaginary 
town is equally paradoxical. The camera shoots something that is at once real and 
imaginary, an original fake. Computer generated images that represent nothing outside 
that computer’s own mode of operation pose similar problems to semiotics and artifacts 
。r objects of design can be seen in the same semiotically paradoxical state. Saying that 
something, a unicorn, Gotham City, a spoon or a stone, for that matter, refers to itself is 
just an effort to save a misguiding objectivism by attributing actor status to 。이ects. 
Things, like unicorns, are what they mean to us in our experience neither because a 
theory tells us which experiences are legitimate (even so semiotics may just try to do this 
in its own domain) nor because the things have the intention to represent themselves in 
ways they do. 
Its Inability 01 Self-reflexion. Let me conclude my criticism by pointing to what 
might underlie all four of the difficulties mentioned: Mainstream semioticians see the 
object of semiotic analysis, the world of semiosis, as existing independent and outside of 
their describing it. This sharp distinction between the semiosis as observed by a 
detached semiotician and what semioticians do in their own work prevents semioticians 
from entering their own empirical domain and makes their own theories and empirical 
accounts of semiotic phenαnena immune to semiotic considerations. It also enables 
them to deny responsibility for the very semiosis their semiotic accounts may set in 
motion in those addressed, in the phenomena being described, including in their own 
cognition. In short, mainstream semiotics is non-reflexive if not authoritarian in 
consequence (in the sense of both being unquestionably above and not caring for the 
cognition of those affected by it). In stating this so bluntly, 1 do not imply unethical 
intentions or devious conduct, but, as 1 suggested earlier, that it is the semiotic 
conceptualizations 
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whereas men see in their home a place to withdraw after work, view television and relax, 
a place to play with kids and be with friends and a place to keep one’s material 
possessions. It also concluded that most home layouts were created by male architects 
and afforded men’s home uses more so than women’s. Notwithstanding that the very 
act of asking these questions may have made interviewees aware of the phenomenon 
being addressed, notwithstanding also the preference of scientific "findings" t。
emphasize large frequencies (majorities) , commonalties and averages at the expense of 
exceptions or deviations from main findings, when such scientific reports become 
instructions to architects to develop layouts appropriate to women’s "needs," then past 
sexual stereotypes are being reinforced, establish themselves as norms and become 
built into the solid layouts of a home whose "forcing functions" might make it less and 
less possible for women to escape. 
Obviously, even innocent descriptions never are entirely neutral. The semiosis 
that Flade’s insightful "report" encourages has the potential of unintentionally reinforcing 
the appalling sexual stereotypes whose observation motivated the study. A lesson of 
this example could be to report not the facts as "found" but what this study could give 
rise to when embodied in the practice of living in architectural spaces. It serves here as 
an adequate demonstration that semioticians, through their inquiries into the meanings 
of others, are themselves involved in a semiosis that constructs and hence changes the 
very reality they seek to describe so innocently. Objectivists are committed to render 
nothing other than accurate descriptions and are thereby prevented from understanding 
the self-reference of their own practice. 
Without claiming to know the right way, I am afraid, the objectivist road might lead 
to a "semiotized world" f비I of problems and contradictions that may leave little space for 
alternatives and to feel at home. Let me therefore retract from the road commonly 
travelled to where a smaller path branched of and continue in a radically different 
direction. 
The Trail Worth Blazing: Towards a Constructivist Semantics 
I have to be brief now. let me therefore demand, foremost of myself and with 
implicit justification taken from the preceding, that 
(i) Semantics, as a theoretical discourse on meaning, be embedded in human 
understanding as a recursive cognitive process. Humans should be recognized 
as constitutive participants in the worlds any semantic theory may construct. 
(ii) My understanding and, hence, also the semantics I am 
concerned with here, must embrace (Ieave space for and take account of) others’ 
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understanding of the social practices through which we might be concerned with 
each other. Semantics arises out of social practices, informs them in return and 
therefore must be valid for observers and for observed others alike. 
(iii) On the premise that understanding always is someone’s self-reflective 
achievement and never finished as such, semantics should be creative and 
constructive of further understanding and enable the construction 01 coherent 
worlds, the design of meaningful artifacts and discourse presumed 
understandable by others included. 
It would follow that such a semantics must spell out the cognitive operations of 
understanding it is intrinsically concerned with. It should not designate a class of 0비ects 
。f interest, for example signs, but the cognitive processes that brings them into being 
Let me mention a few processes a constructivist semantics should embrace 
Understanding. To me, understanding is a recursive process of constructing 
(deconstructing, reconstructing and inventing) (reality) constructions whose cognitive 
unfolding (into various practices, interventions and actions) preserves the very process 
of construction within the experiences of its embodimenl. Let me elaborate on some of 
its properties. 
Understanding is a cognitively autonomous process. It arises within individual 
cognition. It is personal and private. It can be neither transmitted to someone else nor 
imposed from the outside. (Any "influence" is a matter of one’s own causal 
constructions on how different experiences are connected, how one chooses to explain 
them). Understanding is not 마 something outside, understanding is, onq미맥， a 
process. The eigen value of understanding (where the process converges to with time) 
may be the feeling that one’s reality constructions are coherent, sufficiently complete 
and viable in practice. 
Understanding is a recursive process. As such it builds on its own products, piles 
explanations on top of explanations, continuously decomposes, reconstructs, elaborates 
and transforms the constructions already there, weaving concurrent experience into 
them. "Original" or "raw" experiences, which are hardly accessible as such, recede with 
time in their importance for directing the process. 
Understanding is a creative and constructive undertaking. Reality constructions 
therefore happen by invention, not by necessity. This is far from saying that 
understanding is arbitrary. Understanding directs its own history and is constrained by 
experiences arising from its unfolding constructions into (social) practices and by 
contingencies (perturbations) from its embodiment. It is within these constraints that its 
artifacts may arise spontaneously. If understanding were structure-determined and 
’ 
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individuals would therefore have no choice in how they construct their realities, a sense 
of self could not arise and nobody could be held responsible lor their actions. If 
understanding were totally arbitrary, without a viability check, individuals would have to 
be solipsists and as such unable to respect, live and communicate with others like them. 
Thus, the notion 01 understanding here proposed may be nothing more than a creative 
perpetuation 01 socially viable constructions. 
Understanding delines its own horizon. What is within seems coherent and 
meaninglul, what is beyond escapes comprehension (or may not be seen at all). The 
horizon may expand, 01 course, with experiences and in time, but only Irom within. For 
example, as it directs its own history, understanding also provides the passing contexts 
(01 reality constructions) for perturbations to enter. However, the causes of these 
experiences cannot be known outside of understanding or constructing them--which 
would keep them inside that horizon. For any one individual, there can therelore be no 
reality, no (social) practice independent of his or her understanding 
Understanding dedicates all 01 its processes, all 01 its resulting reality 
constructions (including the construction 01 an observing self, others, a physical world 
and its horizon) to the preservation of understanding (coincidentally including its 
embodiment, for example, in the medium 01 a biological system which may remain 
unknown as such). One could also say, the purpose 01 understanding is to sustaining 
itself in the lace 01 perturbations arising lrom its embodiment.9 Alternatively, it could be 
said that cognitive systems are constituted or constitute themselves to sustain their 
recursive understanding including themselves. Or, as Spencer-Brown concluded, "we 
cannot escape the fact that the world we know is constructed in order (and thus in such 
a way as to be able) to see itsell" (1972:105). 
Understanding and (social) practice belong to different phenomenal domains, to 
different realities. Anyone’s (participation in social) practice is inseparably lused and 
hence indistinguishable from his or her own sell-understanding. Observing and seeking 
to understand the practices in which others participate involves seeking to understand 
the understanding by others. One's own understanding and someone else’s 
understanding have different embodiments and therelore belong to dif 
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understanding. 
With this understanding of understanding in mind, let me develop a few concepts 
for a constructivist semantics. 
Position. The distinction between my understanding and my effort to understand 
a social practice in terms of someone else’s understanding gives rise to different 
positions one may take within one’s own reality constructions. For example, in 
communication research, one may want to distinguish between the position of the author 
and the positions of different kinds of readers vis-a-vis that of the communication 
researcher who links both through a text. The text may be something entirely different 
for each. To capture this difference (without privileging one’s own reading as right and 
everyone else’s as wrong or biased in degrees) requires the ability to take different 
positions. Taking different positions from which to construct and see something that 
may appear to us to be the same for everybody enables choices among alternative 
constructions of reality and accordingly requires taking responsibilities for constructing 
them. 
Objectivist knowledge is positionless. Indeed, the belief in the existence of a 
single reality outside its observer, a uni-verse, which is the same for everyone, renders 
alternative positions meaningless. What is seen then is projected onto this outside reality 
for which no one can be held responsible except for having to accurately describe it. In 
this belief, alternative forms of understanding become human failures or distortions of 
reality 
Minimally, positions are evident in our describing what we see (the people in our 
lives or the artifacts we handle) relative to our body. Someone is a father, an employee 
or an id미 to me or to someone else but not necessarily to both. "Hard" and "soft" are 
defined relative to our experiences of touch. Whether we talk about people or 
computers, either has a front, facing us, and a back, facing away from us. And when we 
describe the functionality of artifacts we refer to what 쁘l2. are able or unable to do with 
them, whether they help or hinder 브흐 Thus, our self is intricately involved in how we see 
even the most elementary things. Helga and Hans-Juergen Lannoch (1989) used this 
natural self-reference in ordinary language descriptions of form to argue for a non-
geometric notion of space that includes the position of the observer. 
The situation is more complicated when we have reasons to believe that what we 
are seeing from our position has positions of its own and different from us, when we do 
not merely observe but observe the observing by others. This is the key t。
understanding human communication. In human communication, the cognitive 
autonomy of others, including their ability to choose positions of their own must be 
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mutually respected else interaction ceases to be social and reduces to manipulating 
。thers as tools. 
However, 1 do not want to get into issues of communication here. Instead, 1 want 
to elaborate on the earlier question of what it takes to understand someone else’s 
meaning (of something) , which is the prototypical question semantic analyses should 
answer. If we say we see only meanings, as Neisser suggests, or affordances, as 
Gibson ciaims, or the experiential consequences of the embodiments of our own reality 
constructions, then such positionless statements as "the Iion is a symbol of protection ," 
"red means danger" or "the airodynamic shape of a car indicates its speed" would not 
make sense without knowing who is talking. (For this reason , 1 argued that Friedlander’s 
promulgations are Friedlander’s account of Friedlanders perceptions, unjustifiably 
projected onto everybody else). As soon as we speak about others with cognitive 
capabilities similar to our own then we can no longer insist that Q핀뭉댁 respond to how 
쁘흐 see things. We have to respect their own understanding. Thus, asserting what 
something means for others constitutes a relationship between constructions on 
different logicallevels: our understanding and our construction of someone else’S 
understanding. It entails that we acknowledge our own position from which we see (or 
understand) and to construct from this very position the positions of others from which 
we have reasons to suspect they see (or understand) differently. In a constructivist 
semantics taking positions and appreciating (by construction) the positions others take 
is critical. 
1 might add here in passing a distinction, proposed elsewhere (Krippendorff, 
1990b) among three kinds of positions, that of a becomer, of an observer and of a 
subject. In the area of semantics, becomers realize their own semiosis and are involved 
in a continuous process of self-realization. Becomers are aware of making themselves 
at home in their own understanding. Observers are aware of their ability to construct 
and reconstruct signs, symbols and artifacts outside themselves but not that this could 
apply to their own position and to themselves. Designers are prone to taking this 
position. Subjects see themselves as having to adapt and therefore willingly subject 
themselves to realities constructed as residing outside their participation and control , for 
example, to fixed meanings, unquestionable 1 
created in taking different positions and in this difference might lie the fundamental 
notion of a sign 
Metaphor. Objectivists have little analytical use for metaphors, variously 
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describing them syntactically as literary figures of speech, semantically as making vague 
。r allusory references and pragmatically as forms of poetic embellishment and all along 
blaming them for inconclusive thinking. To me, metaphors, while manifest in certain 
linguistic figures or visual forms, reflect a very precious cognitive operation. Metaphors 
seem vague and uncertain only when one is destined to look for referents outside 
cognition. 
Roughly, "metaphors make us see one thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). They become manifest in changing our perceptions. 
More specifically, there always are (1.) two distinct domains of experiences, (2.) a 
structure, pattern or principle of construction is transferred or carried from one (and 
usually well understood) domain into another (and usually inadequately understood) 
domain which it thereby (3.) organizes in ways not experienced or seen without this 
import. The latter involves fitting existing parts from the target domain into new wholes. 
Once the imported structure makes sense (4.) metaphors serve as a bridge for bringing 
a variety of additional entailments to the target domain. Two examples will suffice 
People use all kinds of nonprescription drugs for all kinds of reasons. In the U.S. , 
the complex web of motivations for drug production, dissemination and use is 
increasingly understood through war metaphors. Although there are other ways of 
understanding drug use, for example, as a disease (medical metaphor) , as a community 
。r educational issue (social metaphor) or as criminal behavior (legal metaphor) , 
accounts of "the war on drugs" by politicians, the media and ordinary folks make it into a 
battleground. Whereas a medical metaphor entails treatment and care for the diseased, 
the war metaphor entails a distinction between friends and foes, brings forth and 
mobilizes resources to fight the enemy, justifies even the invasion of another country, 
Panama as it were, calls for personal sacrifices, winning or losing being the only 
outcomes. Metaphors are not true or false. They organize perceptions and actions 
through their terms. 
Another example is the shape of personal computers. There is no natural form. 
The boxes of a mainframe computer are as good as the human figure of a fictional robot 
Since the working of a computer is underst 
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domains. However, they also drove their evolution. The first PC’s had line screens. The 
user saw his or her outputs not much different from how it came out of a typewriter, line 
by line and moving up the screen. But TV also shows colors which were added t。
computers as a matter of course. TV also has moving images and sound which are now 
being realized in various hyper-card applications. 80, the entailments of the TV 
metaphor drives computer development within the horizon of understandability. 
From the point of view of a constructivist semantics, metaphors are far from 
representations that are plagued by referential ambiguity and falsehood. Underlying 
their linguistic expression are rather definite cognitive operations that create new 
perceptions and organize actions, render meaningful what heretofore was 
incomprehensible and constitute new realities we thereafter observe with surprising 
certainty. Metaphors reflect a cognitive process that creates new meanings. 
Metonymy: Sense and Function. Metonymy reflects the cognitive operation of 
relating pa야s to wholes. It explains or overcomes the difference created by drawing a 
distinction between something and wherein it resides, what it is a part of, the 
background against which it comes to the fore, for examples, between inside and 
。utside ， between text and context, between an organism and its environment and 
between the observer and the observed. Clearly, neither wholes nor parts (which are 
wh이es in their own right) can e씨앉 without the two cognitive operations of drawing part-
whole distinctions and making sense of what keeps the thus created parts together. 
Elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1988, 1990a), 1 suggested a distinction between 
meaning and sense, describing them as the result of two different operations on 
experiences. We say that âomethina makes sense when we understand the role it plavs 
in a particular contex1, when we have a metonymic understanding of what we see it 
does. It makes sense that the movement of a pen over paper leaves a mark. It makes 
sense that a bolt holds two pieces of hardware together. In contrast, the meaning of 
something is the sum total of all the contexts for which we are able to imagine a sense 
for it. My pen does not just write, it can serve me in numerous capacities for eexample, 
to operate my computer wristwatch. In short, âomethina means (or enables someone t。
anticipate and see) its possible contexts of us~. Thus, by analogy, sense is to meaning 
as actuality is to potentiality, as performance is to competence (Chomsky) or as speech 
is to language (8aussure). We acquire sense by perception and action. We acquire 
meaning by grouping the many senses we could make (of something) in different 
settings into a recognizable class. 1 have frequently argued that Qesian is makina sense 
띠다미며원 (Krippendorff, 1989, 1990a). It calls for designing meaningful things, artifacts 
whose workings are understandable in particular contexts and by prospective users. 
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Metonymy probably reflects the cognitive prerequisite of objectivist notions of 
sign. For example, for a cause to become an index of its consequence (or for a 
consequence to indicate its cause) presupposes (1) drawing a distinction in time and in 
kind between two events and (2) explaining the difference thus created in causal terms 
Onlya야er these cognitive operations were performed on the initially undifferentiated and 
whole experience, can one event serve as an index of the absent other. Classical 
examples of metonymies are taking a crown as a sign for a monarchy, using (the image 
。f) a table setting as the sign for a restaurant, making a logo designate a corporation 
(e.g. by imprinting it on every communication, building or product). 
Helene Karmasin 10, in her plenary presentation, gave several good examples of 
efforts to change the definition of products by presenting them in new contexts for TV 
viewers to make sense of, for example, deodorants in the context of romantic success or 
expensive cat food in the context of treating someone spe미al ， the cat, for giving 
invaluable companionship. The aim of this form of advertising is to create metonymies 
that encourage viewers to make sense that can be generalized to a belief in buying, not 
a mere chemical that removes odors, but a means to interpersonal success or not mere 
food to feed a cat but a way of cultivating cor끼panionship. 
Metonymy also underlies functional analyses, ranging from the social sciences to 
engineering. Sociology, for example, defines the function of an individual act by how it 
contributes to the well-being (essential prerequisites) of a society. In social psychology, 
social roles are described by the function a person performs by virtue 마 holding an 
。ffice ， position or title within a social organization. In systems theory, the function of a 
subsystem is what it does relative to all other parts of the larger system, mathematically 
expressed by an equation relating inputs to outputs. 
Being serious about the possibility of taking different positions within one’sown 
reality constructions, 1 am suggesting that a fun다ion is nothing other than the 
disembodied sense somethina makes in a professionallv privileaed context 
"Disembodied" because it surrenders one’s own position to a virtual community or group 
defined by the presumption of sharing a discourse, seeing alike or making the same 
sense of things. "Privileged" because the context i 
19 
semioticians. AJI speech communities tend to privilege their own functional discourses. 
For example, an AI engineer may consider the functional architecture of a computer as 
the only reality that counts and user conceptions as secondary, subjective and unreal , 
whereas a user may see that computer primarily as a device for acquiring a competitive 
advantage over others, rendering the senses made by others less important. Similarly, 
when designers get excited about an unusual artilact, their professional discourse 
prevents them from analyzing their emotions and instead places such an artifact in the 
context of sociaJly established aesthetic theories which just때 arguing in terms of 
proportions, symmetries, repetitions, etc. , not realizing that this way 01 seeing is rather 
specialized to their profession. 
Sense and functions arise out of the same metonymic processes but differ in the 
responsibilities taken or refused for what is seen 
Polysemy: Meanings and Affordances. By accounting lor meanings, for 
example, in terms of contents 01 containers as in "x has the meaning 01 Y" or in terms of 
correspondences as in "x substitutes lor Y," objectivist semiotics favors one-to-one 
relationships. Dictionaries, catalogues 01 symb이s and codes describing such 
relationships are witness to these preferences and when such one-to-one descriptions 
cannot be achieved, contexts are sought out as disambiguating agents. This is merely 
an effort to rule out p이ysemy. Consider a few examples 01 uses 01 the word "play:" 
to p1ay tennis 
to play down an ìssue 
to play something in someone else's hands 
to play around with someone of the opposite sex 
to play a game of chess 




"play" plays different roles in different contexts 
"play" plays different roles in different contexts. 
In these examples, there seem to be few if any commonalties among the senses in which 
"play" decisively participates. It would therefore be difficult to claim the word to have a 
core meaning that different contexts merely modify (see synecdoche below). "Play" 
simply is polysemous which is to say that it can assume a range of roles in different 
situations. The only constancy in these examples is the word "play." 
In view of the chamelion-like senses something can make in different contexts, the 
semiotic ideal of finding simple correspondences between sign-vehicles and what they 
refer to or mean, also expressed in the apparent need lor disambiguation, may be a 
hopeless il not oppressive undertaking, save lor the most restricted semantic domains, 
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for examples, traffic signs, legal terms, technical vocabulary, military ranks and 
dictionaries used in teaching. In fact, in all of the latter examples there are institutional 
reasons for forcing unambiguous use. What is needed here is some kind of field theory 
of meaning. 
In the preceding, 1 defined sense as an ex이anation of what something is seen as 
actuallv doingln apa며C비ar context of experiences, the role it plays for someone, and 
meanings as the roles something 으민』디 play or what it could be made to 뎌Q in a range of 
imaginable contexts. 80, a pen is not just an instrument for writing. It can also be a 
pointer, a stylus, a projectile, a book mark, a reason for holes in one’s pocket, a 
fingernail cleaner, a gift, a status symbol , a sales item, an expense, something to hold a 
women’s hair in a knot, etc. , etc. Although some uses of a pen, may be more typical 
than others, the word "play" does not seem to have a single most outstanding sense. 
When Neisser suggests we see rneanings, not stimuli or things, this would entail that we 
see in a chair the possibility of our sitting on it, moving it, stapling it, etc. , or that we see 
in a Porsche the possibility of driving fast, impressing someone else, etc. This is not t。
suggest that we always have in mind all the cμIturally conceivable contexts of use for 
what meets our senses, but that the meanina of somethina eauals our oresent 
anticioation of what we could do with it. in which contexts it would make sense to us 
Meanings always are relative to someone’s circumstances of understanding. 
A concept closely related to this notion of meaning is affordance. Gibson (1979, 
1982) originally coined the term to account for his observation that pilots, seeking to land 
their aircraft, look for and see in the surfaces they are exposed to not what it is but 
whether an aircraft is "landß.미51." He extended this idea to perception in general , 
suggesting that something becomes a chair because it is perceived as affording sitting, 
that something becomes a cup because it is seen as affording the containment of fluids, 
etc. Gibson certainly was an objectivist or realist as he described himself who believed 
that it is the nature of the perceived 。이ect that provides information and does the 
affording. This led him to disembodied accounts analogue to that of functions as 
discussed above but, unlike the objectivism of his period, his affordances clearly are 
anticipatory and describe abilities or potentialities. Gibson’sa 
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in the cycle 01 production and consumption) 01 artilacts become assailable and 
questions about what a depersonalized object (as seen by designers) may mean t。
partic비ar users can be answered. One could say, designers, like good communicators, 
engage in discursive practices through the articulation 01 artilacts whose meanings lor 
particular users must also be afforded by them else a user will approach his or her 
environment with expectations that are bound to lail (Krippendorff, 1989). However, t。
state such a relationship between affordances and meanings, as in the previous 
sentence, requires a relativistic understanding 01 different individuals’ understanding, 
including one’s own. This relativity withdraws the objectivity lrom Gibsons claims and 
makes the very difference between affordances and meanings 01 prime interest to a 
semantics for designers. It also shifts the aim 01 design lrom creating aesthetic lorms 01 
products to providing those affordances that enable ordinary users to understand their 
artilacts in their own way and to engage with them in socially desirable practices 
(ultimately with the designers as well). 
Thus, a constructivist semantics must recognize p미ysemy as a normal case, not 
as the undesirable exception. It should look lor meanings in the multitude 01 contexts 
someone is capable 01 constructing lor something to make sense. It has to relativise 
such meanings by taking into account different positions, particularly comparing one’s 
。wn understanding with understanding 01 someone else’s understanding 01 what either 
may understand quite differently. To reduce object-meaning relationships to one-to-one 
correspondences or codes, like purporting the lion to be a symb이 01 protection, 
suppresses the very scope 01 understanding a constructivist semantics seeks t。
provide. 
Synedoche: Types and Tokens. Often conlused with metonymy, synecdoche 
rellects the cognitive operation 01 relating (not parts to wholes but) species to genera, 
tokens to types, objects to categories, etc. It is the process by which we identify what 
something is, to which category it belongs which underlies the linguistic notion 01 
connotation. It enables the naming 01 something not previously experienced by relating 
it to a lamiliar type 
Objectivists deline categories in terms 01 what all the instances 01 a category or 
the elements 01 a set have in common. 11 This most naturally leads to logical 
taxonomies 01 downwardly increasing commonalities. The elaborate classilication 
systems 01 signs in semiotics provide ample examples 01 the consequence 01 such a 
delinition 
Constructivist semantics relies instead on the cognitive operations that invoke 
identifying and categorizing experiences. It delines categories not by boundaries but by 
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their center, often called prototype, ideal type or type for short. The evidence in favor of 
the latter is strong and has a considerable history. There is Wittgenstein’s (1958) 
concept of family resemblance according to which a category of things need not be 
represented by what they all have in common but by the connectivity among its 
members. There is Chomsky’s argument that we cannot learn a language by being 
exposed to all sentences of that language for we construct new ones all the time and 
understand even ungrammatical sentences with ease. There is Rosh’s (1978) work on 
prototypes suggesting that we can far easier express how close something is to what is 
most typical of a category, its prototype, than to draw a boundary around all members. 
Athavankar (1989, 1990) explored categorization and protαype theory for design 
in which the identification of something is an important issue when marketing an entirely 
new product or redesigning a familiar artifact. The boundaries between a cup, a mug 
and a bowl may be fuzzy but the ideal- (or proto-) type is clear for any one user. Jochen 
12" Gros once described the type of a category of artifacts as its "Wesen '",, or essence 
Recently Johnson (1987) suggested that meaning forms a category as well , 
connecting a multitude of contexts that may have nothing in common other than that the 
same thing links the different senses it participates in into a single category, the category 
。f the artifact. One could argue that anything seen always already is an artifact of 
cognition by virtue of meaningful prototypes available for it 
Cognitive Models: Schemas and Scripts. When we approach a new 
experience, we always bring to it a repertoire of patterns for understanding, structures 
that have guide the coordination of perception and action in the past, maps we have 
available to walk in similar terrain, scripts we are accustomed to follow, often without 
much thinking. These phenomena may be captured here by a single concept. To me, ß 
c。anitive model is a recurrent pattern that recursivelv connects experiences and maps 
then into understandina so that we mav reason with them. Let me elaborate. 
Basic schemas, like cause and effect, map and territory, sign and referent, text 
and context, actor-action-targets and the semiotic triangle already are cognitive models, 
albeit simple and general ones. These organize many experiences semioticians have as 
evident in semiotic discourses. What is importan 
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__ environment. Within what such an environment affords, cognitive models entail their 
。wn limitations. They work or remain viable as long as their unfolding into social 
practices does not create difficulties for themselves or end up in a breakdown or trap. 
However, having said that understanding, our cognitive models included, has n。
knowable outside referent, we nevertheless can study the cognitive models held by 
。thers in our own understanding and compare them with our own constructions of the 
practice they inform. This seems possible because our ability to reason with them and to 
express them in verbal discourse. For example, Kempton (1987) carefully analyzed the 
verbal accounts given by different users of thermostatic home heat control devices and 
could construct from them what seemed to be the guiding conceptions of the practices 
he could observe. Kempton found that individuals approached thermostats either with 
the cognitive model of a valve or with the cognitive model of a feedback loop. Those 
guided by the valve model caused more extreme temperature differences, had to reset 
the thermostat more frequently and experienced more frustrations than those guided by 
the feedback model. The material system afforded both cognitive models, of course, but 
brought forth rather different experiences for their beholders. The fact that there are 
engineers who know the system they constructed does not enter the experiences of 
either kind of users who saw no reason to change their conceptions. 
The for practical purposes absence of correspondence criteria for evaluating 
cognitive models is most striking in the design of user interfaces for computers. The 
interior of a computer is virtually incomprehensible to most competent users. Within the 
extremely wide confines afforded by a computer, users have the freedom to develop 
their own and often rather weird conceptions of how the computer does what is 
experienced and in turn use those conceptîons that worked to generate experîences that 
would follow from them. These conceptîons often come from entirely different domains 
of experiences (see metaphors) and computer înterface designers may take advantage 
of cognitive models in use to design operations that afford them. For example, by 
affording opening and storing files, discarding documents in a waste basket which have 
little to do with what the computer does but much with schemas of human 
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understanding of the cognitive models in use and discourse probably is the best window 
into their cognitive constructions. Cognitive models cannot be shoved aside as "mere" 
conceptual. They are demonstrably real 
Interactivity: Semiosis and Involvement. As a final point, 1 am suggesting that 
a constructivist semantics would have to embrace change as a constitutive principle of 
understanding. Mainstream semiotics’ self-imposed aim to describe the world in terms 
of binary relationships as enshrined in the semiotic triangle not only limits the complexity 
of the phenomena it is led to tackle but also betrays what probably motivated its 
。riginators ， Charles S. Peirce for example, to initiate the project, and this is semiosis, the 
process by which signs come to be, semiogenesis if you wish. Inquiries int。
relationships presupposes they exist as such and looking for codes makes one find 
them in the stabilities of a world that resists variation. In this kind of semiotics, semiosis 
reduces to learning established signs, adapting to existing conventions and institutions 
and supporting the status quo. A theme that ran through much of this paper is that 
cognition is inherently restless. People’s understanding not merely adapts but creates 
social practices. There are many realities, not one, and these are constantly taken apart 
and constructed anew when we cognitively or discursively attend to them. Asserting 
something, like producing an artifact, always changes the world we live in, albeit by small 
measures. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the already mentioned world of modern 
personal computers. Computers are general purpose machines to start out with on 
which hardware designers impose a simple architecture that users cannot change 
Beyond this, there is a whole industry that competitively provides software for making 
computers more understandable to users. Software links the computer designers' 
understanding of how a system works to users' understanding of the same. It is by 
traditional definitions a mechanism of communication between the two, but of a 
qualitative new kind. The critical feature of such a mechanisms is not to influence, t。
control or to enforce a particular behavior, but 따흐디빡르 users, senders or receivers, t。
do something with and in terms of their very own understanding. 
By comparison, traditional machines essentially are trivial in structure, embodying 
particular input-output relations. 13 They are conceived as tools whose specialized use 
has to be learned and perfected. They force users to adapt to them. The motivation for 
lheir employment largely derives from achieving certain goals outside of th 
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understanding. This makes them more adapting to users' cognition than the other way 
around. The motivation for their use comes less from extrinsic achievement but from 
intrinsic involvement in the process of unfolding ones cognition in interactive practices. 
The more natural it feels, the more self-directed one can move and the more open t。
meaningful alternatives a computer is, the more fun it is to interact if not play with it. The 
evolution from word processors to Macintosh windows to hyper-media applications and 
to virtual realities is semiosis at its best. 
Science always had an affinity to technology, sometimes using it as a testbed for 
its theories and sometimes taking from it models and metaphors for constructing its 
theories. It seems that we have to move away from the objectivist vocabulary of icons, 
codes, causal chains and binary relations, away from reprensentational and instrumental 
conceptions of language and away from the search for accurate descriptions, 
predictions and control, all of which are so clearly tied to trivial machine conceptions. 
The artifactual world we now experience has grown far beyond our traditional horizon of 
understanding. We have to catch up to lead its ongoing semiosis 
Modern computers do not provide the only metaphors for what a constructivist 
semantics should be concerned with. Interactive practices of deconstruction, 
reconstruction and designing social realities in which participants understanding thrives 
in cooperation with each other, creating institutional processes in which new realities are 
envisioned and put into pr없s and the very effort of constructing a constructivist 
semantics for the design of meaningful artifacts among others , product semantics for 
short, a semantics that brings forth the phenomena it claims to be about, these provide 
ample examples of semiotic practices that could provide their own metaphors of 
understanding. 
Let me conclude with the quote from a magician of our trade who, through his 
。wn "Iooking glass," may have anticipated much of what 1 was proposing here by having 
his characters engaged in this dialogue: 
"When 1 use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone "it means just 
what 1 choose it to mean--neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you εan make words mean so many 
different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master that’s al l." (Lewis 
Carroll , 1982:184) 
My answer would have to be found not in the authority of a semiotician but in the 
constructions we must create by ourselves to live in. 
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Footnotes 
1 See a special issue of the Industrial Designer~ ~ociety_ of America’s magazine, 
띠nov학띠n흐효， 21984; a special double issue 이 Desian Issues Q, 2, 1989; the 
Proceedings from the eroduct Semantics ’8~ Conference, Seppo Vakeva (Ed.). 
Helsinki: Llniversity of Industrial Aπs ， 1990. 
2 For example Ernst von Glasersfeld’s (1984) radical constructivism, Kenneth 
(,ler9E!f"!’s (1985~ ，soci~12o~~tr~9~~~!s~， Peter, Be~g~~ ~"n~'l!~ol1l~~. Lu.c~~ann’s 
Socíal Construction of RealitY. (1967), George Lackoff (1987) and Mark Johnson’s 
(1987) cognitivism and varion~ s~ades_0 naive constructivisms ranging from 
George Kelly (1955) to Jesse Delia (1977). 
3 Congress participants may recognize here a certain parallelismin Humberto 
Maturana’s tWo kinds of explanations offered by observers. Speaking on the 
biological foundations of signs, Maturanais correct by saying that in the history of 
ev이ution nothing happens by necessity, that we have no choice bιJt to live with 
\iVhat did h~pp~ned and ~~at eX'plan~~i<?n~ a~.~ in my ~ord~ o~tional ph，eno~ena. 
However, I am interested here in a slightly different domain where explanations 
and social practices inform each other. In the domain of design, we occasionally 
do make choices or at least experience the making of ch미ces， not just among 
explanations but also in setting "the switches" for further explanations, hence the 
importance, of the two paths here. 
4 The difficulty of applying correspondence truth criteria also came to light in 
Thomas Sebeok’s paper to this congress on "viπual reality," a computer-
generated interactive world providing virtually real experiences to users. He 
grotjr뼈d the unce때inty 엄garding what 엄ality is in conclusions 때ionally 
erived at by certain philosophers but then proceeded to distinguish between 
virtual realities, simulations and other forms of representation as if an unqualified 
reality would knowably exist outside of us, as if the uncertainty as to how reality is 
constituted could be ignored in its representations 
5 In a recent article, Helga Lannoch and Hans-Juergen Lannoch (1989) 
recognize t,hat ~he orthogonaU~ of ge~f!1etr!c space ct?nception~ can,:ot 
accommodate human perception and developinstead a semantic notion of space 
whose attributes are relative to the position 0• the observer within this space. 
6 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690 
7 Helene Karmasin, "Mehrweπ durch Zeichenwahl, Semiotik in der Analyse von 
Marketing und Werbung," P 
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understand the (social) practices of 마면댄 in terms of their understanding, since 
understanding cannot exist outside of its embodyment (in a circular network of 
perception an-d_ acti~n c,?nstitution.ally. inv()lving the b~ologX of~hat other) , the 
maintenance of a biological organization through self-production, which 
autopoiesis seeks to explain, is a prerequisite for understanding to take place. In 
the long run, understanding cannot contradict the autopoiesis of its embodyment. 
10lbid. 
11 See George Lackoff (1987) for a good discussion of this difference. 
12 Jochen Gros, Form, sometimes before 1984. 
13 For an elaboration of the trivial machine notion see H. von Foerster (1984) 
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